A Brief History of Federal Inuit Policy Development: Lessons in Consultation and Cultural Competence

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Introduction

Consultation is a loaded concept in federal Aboriginal policy development. Canada now has a legal duty to consult in certain contexts thanks to two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions. These decisions, and the situations that may trigger a legal duty to consult, however, continue to be open to interpretation. This is one reason why Aboriginal organizations increasingly refuse to use the term “consultation” when entering into discussion with Canada—for fear that any talks will be interpreted by Canada as fulfillment of its legal duty to consult and used as justification for taking certain policy decisions. The “meaningful consultation” concept is an evolving area of Aboriginal policy development that will continue to be problematic as long as there are competing views of when and how consultation should take place, or indeed what is involved in meaningful consultations. Compounding the difficulties of reaching agreement on what triggers or constitutes sufficient consultation can be a general mistrust of government. This mistrust stems from a long history in Canada of Aboriginal policies that would have a profound impact on Aboriginal peoples having been put in place without the benefit of consultation, and with sometimes disastrous results.

The Inuit Relations Secretariat (IRS) was created within Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) in 2004 to advocate for Inuit concerns within the federal system. It was established in response to the request by Inuit representatives for a focal point to address Inuit-specific issues within the federal government, and represents a significant advance in the struggle for an Inuit political voice within the federal “system.” One of the challenges facing the IRS and Inuit organizations is establishing new relationships of trust on a legacy of imposed policies and non-existent or inadequate consultation.

When discussions began within INAC on the form and function of the newly announced IRS, the need for greater understanding and appreciation of the historic relationship between Inuit and the Government of Canada was immediately apparent. As a result, a history project was begun that has culminated with the publishing of the book Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of
Policy and Program Development. Government needed to understand and come to terms with the historic relationship in order to create new relationships under the secretariat and elsewhere; the policy-minded historian would argue that we cannot possibly create sound public policy for the future if we are not clear about how it is we got to where we are in the first place. Specifically, this includes an understanding of the mistakes that were made in the past, notably a lack of consultation with Inuit when developing those policies, and a general lack of cultural competence and understanding on the part of policy-makers, service providers, and politicians, which made consultation and true consensus with Inuit difficult to achieve. An understanding of the historic relationship is important not only in terms of making sure that those mistakes are not repeated, but also in terms of understanding the root causes of the mistrust that exists today.

This paper provides a brief overview of the history of Inuit policy development, largely based on the studies that underpin Canada’s Relationship with Inuit, but with specific emphasis on the shortcomings in consultation and the importing of social policies and programs designed in the south without fully considering uniquely northern circumstances or Inuit cultural norms. Some of the topics covered include government taking a more proactive role in Inuit administration with the Re Eskimo decision and E-number identification program, defence and sovereignty concerns which caused a major shift in northern policy and contributed to Inuit relocations, and subsequent post–Second World War federal programming in Inuit education, housing, and health care. Government faced many practical challenges in administering programs to a disperse Inuit population in the North, including difficulty hiring, training, and maintaining staff, as well as transportation and infrastructure costs. Many failures of early policy and program development in meeting the needs of Inuit, however, may also be attributed both to a lack of consultation and lack of cultural competence.

Inuit Administration in the First Half of the Twentieth Century

Eighteenth-century contact with whalers, fur traders, missionaries, and police brought significant change to Inuit life in the Arctic. The introduction of foreign diseases, growing dependence on foreign trade goods and economic markets, missionary attempts at creating ideological and socio-cultural change, and imposition of a foreign justice system have all been noted as examples of the negative influence of culture contact. Others, in less value-laden terms, have noted cultural shifts, sometimes subtle, as a result of increased contact, and specifically access to foreign trade goods. Yet, throughout the early contact period and the changes that it brought, there was also considerable continuity of cultural norms, patterns of subsistence, social structure maintenance. We also see, most importantly autonomy and agency that preceded the more active federal Inuit administration of the post–Second World War era.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the North West Mounted Police (RCMP today), Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), and mostly Anglican missionaries were operating in the North. These organizations became unofficial administrators of Inuit affairs in large part by virtue of their very presence. The police administered law and justice, and performed functions on behalf of the government, such as attempting to collect census information. In addition, the Canadian government expected the Hudson’s Bay Company operating in the North to be aware of challenges facing Inuit, such as food shortages, and to provide assistance where necessary. The HBC had long been in the practice of providing relief to Aboriginal people in times of need, especially over the winter months, which it also undertook as part and parcel of its economic interests. Missionaries, in addition to establishing churches, often established schools and hospitals.

In 1905, the Canadian government’s Northwest Territories Amendment Act created the Northwest Territories (NWT) Council. This council operated from Ottawa, and was comprised of civil servants and the NWT commissioner, who was also the NWMP financial comptroller. The council, however, had no official mandate to administer Inuit affairs. In 1922, the Department of the Interior was reorganized to include a NWT and Yukon Branch with an Eskimo Affairs Unit. This is the first time that Inuit administration was formally recognized by the government. Focus, however, was placed on Inuit affairs in the western and eastern Arctic, as Newfoundland and Labrador were not yet part of Confederation, and Quebec was expected to administer to its north as a provincial government.

Two years later, in 1924, the Indian Act was amended to include Inuit. This was the first time Inuit were recognized in Canadian legislation, but a caveat was nevertheless added to the effect that Inuit would not become legal “wards of the state” like First Nations. These were uncertain times for Canada’s involvement in the North and Inuit administration. There was a sense of newfound independent nationhood and a growing interest in northern resources on the one hand, with the prosperity of the post–First World War years quickly giving way to concern over potential expenses at a time of economic recession on the other. Responsibility for Inuit was transferred to the Department of Indian Affairs at the time of the legislative amendments in 1924, but was transferred back to the Department of the Interior in 1928, and in 1930 the amendment to the Indian Act was repealed.

Also in 1930, the Northwest Territories Act was amended to include three elected northern members on the NWT Council. In addition to this council and the federal department responsible for Inuit affairs, other groups were organized to assist with Inuit and northern administration, including the Eskimo Affairs Committee, which was comprised of civil servants, and representatives from the RCMP, HBC, and churches. This group’s role was to advise and make recommendations based on their experience in the North, and to assist Inuit in the transition to more sedentary communities. None of these administrative changes, however, would likely have been noticed by Inuit as the RCMP and missionar-
ies continued to provide services in the North throughout the early part of the twentieth century.

Re Eskimo and Federal Constitutional Responsibility for Inuit

Federal responsibility for “Indians” is spelled out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act (1867) but Inuit are not mentioned. Throughout the 1930s, after the collapse of the fur trade, the Government of Canada provided some relief to Inuit in the eastern and western Arctic, as well as in Quebec. Quebec, however, was the only province inhabited by Inuit, and the federal government expected reimbursement for these expenses. In 1932, the Government of Quebec refused to continue reimbursing Canada because it felt that Inuit should be federally administered, like First Nations, and in 1935 it brought a case to the Supreme Court alleging that Inuit had been considered Indians at the time of the 1763 Royal Proclamation, and should be considered Indians under Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act (1867). The Supreme Court sided with Quebec in its 1939 Re Eskimo decision, which was based on many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century descriptions of “Esquimaux” as an “Indian Tribe.”

This decision was unexpected for Canada, who initiated a reversal appeal to the Privy Council in England but dropped the appeal with the start of the Second World War. The Canadian government briefly considered comprehensive legislation, similar to the Indian Act, but ultimately decided against it. The Re Eskimo decision did little to alter the delivery of government services or programs for Inuit, however, as committees within the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Mines and Resources after 1936, continued to administer Inuit affairs. Between 1939 and 1945, the government was preoccupied with the Second World War and most attention focused on the North was for sovereignty-related concerns rather than Inuit welfare. In 1951, to avoid the same level of responsibility for Inuit that they had for First Nations, the Indian Act was amended to specifically exclude Inuit, by including the statement that “a reference in this Act to an Indian does not include any person of the race of aborigines commonly referred to as Eskimos.” Although this amendment specifically excluded Inuit from sharing the status of registered Indians, the Re Eskimo decision continues to provide the basis for federal Inuit administration.

The E-number Identification Program

One of the initial challenges facing the federal government in the administration of Inuit affairs in the North, whether directly or through other institutions such as the RCMP or churches, was the keeping of accurate records and statistics. Difficulties administering programs for Inuit included a lack of northern infrastructure and a population that was highly mobile, spread out, and spent long periods of time away from what few centres of administration did exist. These difficulties were compounded by the reality of Inuit social and kinship structure in which surnames were not used and children were often named after significant
or recently deceased family members, regardless of the sex of the name holder or namesake.\textsuperscript{13} Government generally administers programs in accordance with its knowledge of the size of the group being administered, and often requires tracking of individuals who come into contact with the administration, for example for medical services such as vaccination.

What came to be known as the E-number identification system was thus developed as a federal policy in 1941 to assist government officials, including the RCMP, and doctors and nurses, with keeping track of Inuit. Rather than consulting those individuals whose well-being and welfare many of these programs were designed to address, government imposed a system of administration based on numbers being assigned which were to be worn on disks around the neck, similar to military-style “dog tags.”\textsuperscript{14} These numbered disks were used in the delivery of medical services such as eye exams and lung X-rays for tuberculosis, as well as the federal Family Allowance program. Between 1945 and 1970, all Inuit interaction with the federal and provincial or territorial governments required use of E-numbers.

For many Inuit, this system came to represent a form of paternalistic surveillance that epitomized much of what was wrong with the imposition of foreign, southern-based, and inflexible administration created outside of a northern and Inuit cultural context. By the early 1960s government administrators were exploring other options as a result of Inuit dissatisfaction. In 1968, the NWT Council proposed Project Surname, in which federal administrators accompanied by a bilingual Inuk travelled to all northern communities and registered both given and family surnames for Inuit. The project was completed around 1972 and use of E-numbers ended.

The period of Inuit administration leading up to the Second World War can be characterized by government uncertainty over the level of responsibility for Inuit affairs it should have or was willing to take on. This uncertainty helped contribute to a policy that advocated for a continuation of an Inuit traditional way of life, with limited interference. Despite some early awkward attempts by government to impose southern standards of administration across the North, such as the E-number identification system, non-governmental institutions continued to administer many of the services in the North. Inuit over this period began to experience the acculturative tendencies of church-run education, ties to foreign markets, and some incremental intensification of administration imposed from without. Inuit were nevertheless able to maintain a degree of cultural continuity and autonomy away from the full gaze of federal administration. This situation, however, would begin to change with the building of defence projects throughout the North, and the influx of foreign personnel, and increased sedentariness that resulted.
Military Defence, Sovereignty Concerns, and Relocation

Canada’s northern focus was on defence and sovereignty concerns in the immediate years after the *Re Eskimo* decision, during and after the Second World War. The first Canada-United States defence agreement saw the creation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence, established through the 1940 Ogdenburg Agreement, which included the creation of the Alaska Highway, the Northwest Staging Route, and the Canadian Oil (Canol) pipeline. Between 1940 and 1943, thirty thousand American service people were stationed across the Arctic, from Alaska to Greenland, to construct and carry out northern defence projects. Although these projects received joint approval from the Canadian and American governments, they were largely carried out by Americans under American authority.

In 1955, Canada and the United States agreed to construct a chain of sixty-three radar stations—the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line—with forty-two stations located along the Canadian Arctic coast. The stations were American built and operated, but on sites requiring Canadian government approval, subject to Canadian law, and operated from the outset with provisions for eventual Canadian control. In 1957, another agreement, the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD), was struck between Canada and the United States to develop a system of continental air defence. The 1959 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) agreement was an example of NORAD’s defence strategy. In 1980, aging DEW Line technology was replaced with the North Warning System (NWS) and thirteen minimally attended radars (MARs). The cost of upgrading defence technology was again shared by Canada and the United States who continued, through agreements such as NORAD, to cooperate on common defence initiatives in the North.

Inuit in the Northwest Territories and northern Quebec were not consulted about the construction of defence infrastructure or the selection of site locations in the territories that they traditionally inhabited. Significant short-term impact on Inuit included an increasingly sedentary lifestyle, and access to foreign foods and material goods. Defence project sites, including Iqaluit, Broughton Island, Kivitoo, and Ekalugad Fiord, attracted Inuit to congregate nearby for access to employment opportunities and medical services, creating sedentary communities over time. By 1963, NORAD provided employment for 14,700 Canadians (including Inuit) at stations in the North and throughout Canada. Although defence project sites were initially expected to provide temporary employment for Inuit, various cultural differences, such as concepts of work time and levels of training, created difficulties. Some sustained employment was created through the development of programs like the Canadian Rangers, which uses traditional Inuit survival skills and knowledge to assist Canadian and American defence personnel in Arctic operations. Mostly, however, defence programs failed to provide sustained or large-scale employment for Inuit.
Over the long term, an influx of Canadian and American service people and general defence spending in the North has contributed significantly to the northern economy and northern infrastructure. The effects of defence sites on the development of housing, transport, communications, infrastructure, education, and health care have been significant to community development. American criticism of Canadian Inuit policy, or a lack thereof, was further instrumental in the development of Inuit administration and related northern infrastructure. For example, criticism of Inuit housing conditions was a factor in prompting the development of a large-scale construction and home rental program in many northern communities during the 1960s. Inuit settlement in communities was motivated by employment, such as at DEW Line sites, by children attending school, proximity to medical treatment, and housing construction projects.

Although Inuit maintained a pattern of life based on seasonal migrations and resource availability until the mid-twentieth century, since 1960 most Inuit have lived in permanent settlements with access to health care, schools, and other government services. These changes came at some cost to Inuit traditional livelihood, through increased reliance on wage labour and effects of globalization that accompany increased sedentariness. Once settled in communities, Inuit reliance on traditional ways of life could become difficult because of the lengthy travel distances required to find animal resources which were often not available near communities, and the need to maintain a steady family income through wage employment.

Another significant long-term impact of defence projects has been the environmental pollution created by the construction and subsequent abandoning of many of the original sites. There have been some recent attempts to clean up the environmental damage caused by these projects. Based on the initial American construction and operation of the DEW Line sites, the United States government has contributed $100 million over the past ten years under the Canada-United States Military Installations Clean-Up Agreement to Canada’s clean-up projects. The total cost of cleaning up the forty-two Canadian DEW Line sites has been estimated at between $320 and $500 million.

Finally, American activity in the Canadian North created sovereignty concerns for the Canadian government, which would also come to have a profound impact on certain Inuit communities. In 1943, the British high commissioner to Canada toured the Arctic to review project construction, and expressed concern regarding American intent to construct roads and airport infrastructure that would serve commercial interests after the war. These concerns prompted the Canadian government to initiate a greater northern presence, including increasing the number of civil servants stationed in the North, and to develop programs and administration to improve Inuit welfare and create sedentary communities. Creating more sedentary Inuit communities served the dual purpose of making it easier for government to provide services, such as health care, and also helping to address government’s growing sovereignty concerns.
Canada’s effective sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago can be traced back to an 1880 Order-in-Council which confirmed Dominion title and ownership of the islands, and subsequent responsibility for their surveillance. Inuit habitation of the North since time immemorial and this Order-in-Council, as a deed of title, have formed the basis for Canada’s historic claim to sovereignty of the North. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Canadian government became increasingly concerned about the unregulated presence of foreign nationals sailing through passageways between the Arctic Islands. This, and conflicts over fishing rights in the Sverdrup Islands, resulted in increased government-sponsored Arctic tours and the establishment of RCMP posts, initially at Pond Inlet and at Craig Harbour on the southeast corner of Ellesmere Island, followed by Dundas Harbour on Devon Island, Pangnirtung and Lake Harbour on Baffin Island, and Port Burwell in northern Newfoundland.

**Inuit Relocations**

The relocations of Inuit communities that took place in the 1950s and 1960s are the most controversial of the many northern initiatives. These relocations were partially or entirely designed to address Canada’s sovereignty concerns, and were taken in tandem with establishing RCMP posts, official tours of the region, the Northern Rangers program, increased numbers of civil servants, science and exploration, and developing a military presence. The Canadian government initially facilitated Inuit relocations to move Inuit to areas of supposed resources abundance beginning in the 1920s. The HBC also proposed relocation projects to the federal government where they argued Inuit trappers were needed to assist the opening up of posts across the Arctic. In 1934 for example, Inuit from Cape Dorset were relocated to Devon Island when the HBC reopened a post that had closed several years earlier. In the 1940s and 1950s, however, relocations were justified not only in an access to resources context, but were also motivated by sovereignty reasons. Some Inuit were relocated seasonally, such as those in the western Arctic who were encouraged to winter at Banks Island and Herschel Island during the 1950s, with both the assertion of sovereignty and the fear of starvation as motivating concerns. According to the Royal Commission Report on Aboriginal Peoples, in many cases with early relocations, Inuit were satisfied with their new surroundings or were assisted in returning to their original territory if they were unhappy.

Although relocations of Inuit families were supposedly conducted to areas of resource abundance where Inuit could live self-sufficiently, the federal government also had a de facto concern for sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic. The 1953 relocations of Inuit families from Port Harrison (Inukjuak) and Pond Inlet to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord (Craig Harbour) were perhaps the most controversial. Government motivations for the relocation were not clearly conveyed to the Inuit involved or to the Canadian public, and Inuit were moved from northern Quebec to the High Arctic, which involved adaptations to a colder climate and...
longer periods of total light or darkness. Additionally, it is unclear if the government made or honoured promises to return Inuit to northern Quebec if and when requests to return were made.

In 1993, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (RCAP) investigated claims against the government made by Inuit who participated in this relocation and their descendants. A presentation to the commission by then-president of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Rosemarie Kuptana, focused on the cultural and historical context of relations between Inuit and non-Inuit in northern Quebec during the 1950s, and in particular the concept of “ilira.” According to Kuptana, “Inuit use ilira to refer to a great fear or awe, such as the awe a strong father inspires in his children.” The growth of the fur trade and disease epidemics combined to increase Inuit dependency on non-Inuit, including RCMP and HBC staff and missionaries, producing a feeling of ilira among Inuit in their relations with non-Inuit. As Kuptana stated to the commission, real consultation of potential relocations was not possible with Inuit, as “a challenge to the authority of the Qallunaat [white people] or defiance of their requests was almost unthinkable.”

The commission published their report in 1994, concluding that the relocation plan “was inherently unsound, it was misrepresented to Inuit to gain their concurrence, and the means adopted to carry out the plan were equally unsound.” The report went on to state that, however inappropriate the project, “the Government did what it believed to be best for the Inukjuak Inuit in the institutional context of the time.” Although Inuit had requested recognition for their contribution to Canadian sovereignty, the commission concluded that economics, or their belief in the presence of animal resources at Resolute and Grise Fiord, were the primary motivators for the relocation, with sovereignty, to an unknown degree, acting as a material consideration in the sites chosen to relocate Inuit.

By the 1970s the Canadian government was not sponsoring many new relocation projects. While sovereignty of the Arctic Archipelago and defence of the northern coastal mainland were still concerns to the Canadian government, increases in defence technology and American defence partnerships meant that Inuit residency in remote areas was no longer considered so pressing as a means to monitor the North. Also, increased availability of consumer goods in permanent communities meant that Inuit relocations to regions where the government thought there was better hunting and access to natural resources were also no longer considered necessary. Controversy over unsuccessful relocations during the 1950s and 1960s, findings that government-sponsored relocations in the late 1960s and early 1970s did not result in predicted levels of Inuit employment, and the evolving federal-Inuit political relationship all made Canada less likely to initiate further Inuit relocation projects.

In 1972, the Royal Commission on Labrador set out nine principles for future resettlements based on earlier relocation experiences in southern Labrador. These principles recommended that resettlements only occur after extensive consultation with departing and receiving community members, and after planning and
preparation to ensure long-term socio-economic viability of relocated individuals in their new community.\textsuperscript{41} Many communities developed through Inuit relocations, such as Resolute and Grise Fiord, continue to exist, and Inuit today are supportive of measures to ensure Canadian sovereignty of the North and seek to work with the federal government to ensure the environmental sustainability of those measures.\textsuperscript{42} Many Inuit, however, continue to seek redress of past circumstances surrounding relocations and the hardships that resulted, and continue to criticize the Canadian and other Arctic-nation governments for lack of consultation with Inuit in consideration of sovereignty concerns.\textsuperscript{43}

Regardless of the motivation for the relocations, or which of various motivating factors was the primary consideration for Canada at the time, it is the process employed in the relocations, specifically the lack of full and meaningful consultation, which bears examination as a means to address past government policies. The limited consultation that did occur was no doubt consistent with the government’s paternalistic attitudes of the day when developing programs for the Aboriginal population more generally. Added to this government-knows-best attitude was a seeming lack of cultural awareness or inability to take into consideration social norms of behaviour when entering into consultation at the community level. This lack of ability to communicate on an equal footing of mutual understanding is what Rosemary Kuptana was speaking about with the social concept of “ilira” in the Inuit experience of human interaction, which made it difficult for Inuit to challenge the authority of the “Qallunaat.” Even where government officials may have felt they had the concurrence and full cooperation of Inuit in certain circumstances, this may not have been the case at all in the Inuit view. These relocation experiences have resulted in negative feelings and mistrust of government intentions, and speak directly to the ongoing need for cultural competence when developing policy in an Aboriginal context.

**Post–Second World War Program Development in Education, Health Care, and Housing**

In 1950, administration of Inuit was the responsibility of the Northern Affairs Program, which was managed by the Department of Resources and Development, and then the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources from 1953 to 1966. Up until about 1950, the Canadian government advocated for Inuit to retain their traditional way of life. In 1955, however, Jean Lesage, the minister of the newly created Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, announced a new policy for Inuit administration. The objective was to remedy the “almost continuing state of absence of mind” in which Inuit had previously been administered, by introducing a large influx of northern social programs during the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{44} This shift in policy was partly the result of a newfound ethos in Canada (and much of the western world) towards social welfare, and partly in reaction to heavy and sustained criticism from American service men...
and women involved in northern defence projects of what they perceived to be the Canadian government’s neglect of Inuit, including in health care, education, and housing. Several national social welfare programs, which extended to Inuit both as a matter of course and to encourage permanent settlement, were created at this time. Many of the growing cadre of civil servants in the North had little northern experience, and while they may have provided services in a way that seemed most pragmatic at the time, they often did so without the cultural competence required for successful implementation or outcomes.

**Education**

By the end of the Second World War, there were four church-run residential schools and nine day schools in the Northwest Territories and northern Quebec, with several more schools in Labrador. The Canadian government was initially reluctant to increase funding for missionary societies or to take a larger role in developing a federal system of education in the North for an Inuit population that continued to live semi-nomadically. The government had in fact advocated for maintenance of a traditional way of life for Inuit, and was concerned that children educated in residential schools would not learn necessary survival skills. Missionaries and American army personnel stationed in the Canadian North during the 1940s, however, perceived this policy to be shortsighted in failing to provide basic literacy, compared to the education systems for Inuit in Alaska and Greenland. In 1947, the Department of Mines and Resources, through the Bureau of Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs, assumed responsibility for Inuit education, intending to provide the same quality of programming in the North as in southern Canada. To this end, the Department of Resources and Development initiated a sub-committee on Eskimo education in 1952.

A further agreement for federal administration of Inuit education was made in 1955 between federal departments, the NWT Council, and the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches. Under this agreement, the federal government assumed responsibility for all schools, but agreed to partially fund church-run hostels that housed students while they attended school. Hostels were similar in purpose to residential schools but required fewer staff to operate and could be dispersed through more communities, allowing children in some cases to remain closer to their parents while they attended school. Nevertheless, hostels and residential schools removed children from their parents’ care for up to ten months of each year, and, as is now well documented, created cultural alienation between Inuit parents and children.

Initially, the federal system for northern education adopted the curriculum standards from southern Canada. This meant that the subjects and topics covered, and the methods of instruction, were unfamiliar to Inuit and required Inuit to learn English vocabulary for cultural references that were unfamiliar to them, such as the traffic lights and cornfields that were presented in their textbooks. Inuit also experienced difficulty maintaining motivation to learn in a “school system [that]
attempted to introduce them to a value system that stressed individual achievement, advancement and self-discipline in return for future rewards.” Inuit culture was present-oriented and sensitive to the maintenance of community relations, making acculturation to such individualistic and long-term concepts difficult. As well as requesting more culturally sensitive curricula, Inuit expressed interest in programming that would educate adults and would help parents to understand the government’s goals for their children’s education. Elementary school teachers were nearly all from southern Canada, most had no previous experience in northern communities or with Inuit, and had little or no knowledge of Inuit languages or culture when they first arrived.

Education was a highly acculturative force for assimilating Inuit to southern Canadian culture, and Inuit parents had long requested changes to make the curriculum more relevant to Inuit. These requests included involvement of Inuit parents in the classroom as storytellers and guest teachers, use of traditional languages for instruction, and the incorporation of Inuit cultural elements into the curriculum. Efforts were made in the late 1950s and 1960s to address these concerns through programs designed to sensitize southern teachers working in the North, hiring Inuit educational assistants to help classroom teachers by translating lessons and curriculum into Inuit languages, and developing a curriculum that was meant to be more relevant to northern students.

Systemic problems in the educational services continued, however, despite the construction of secondary schools, and efforts to offer a modified curriculum relevant to the North and to ensure that all Inuit children between the ages of six and fifteen were attending school during the 1960s. The dispersed nature of the Inuit population, their semi-nomadic way of life, teacher shortages, and the high cost of providing staff, supplies, and facilities, created difficulties for government administrators in developing an effective system for Inuit education. The government had difficulty both accommodating students in remote locations and keeping pace with the population increase of growing northern communities when Inuit did begin to settle in centralized, permanent locations. Many Inuit chose not to complete secondary studies, or take advantage of post-secondary studies in the south, because of the long separation from their families that was required. Northern teachers reported, “a persistent failure of native peoples to achieve success within the system,” and expressed concern about the “extreme alienation” schooling caused young Inuit attempting to balance their traditional culture practiced at home and the school culture experienced at elementary day schools and secondary residential schools. Inuit also continued to claim “immense dissatisfaction” with many of the policies, curricula, teachers, and educational facilities. In the late 1960s, many parents and non-Inuit teachers alike from smaller communities objected to the federal government’s lack of consultation in deciding to construct the eastern Arctic’s only secondary school in Iqaluit.

Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) has argued against education systems that assimilate Inuit to southern Canadian culture, with consequent loss of their sense of
Throughout the 1970s, Inuit in the Northwest Territories perceived that the federal government was not sufficiently consulting them about the development of educational programs and facilities. In response, Inuit established the National Inuit Council on Education (NICE) within ITK’s Inuit Cultural Institute (ICI) in 1976. The objective of NICE was to determine the feasibility of establishing Inuit-administered education facilities throughout the North, which would provide a more culturally and geographically relevant education system for Inuit children. Rather than relying on the federal government to develop educational infrastructure and curriculum, and to hire educators for northern schools, ITK sought to develop an educational program that would encourage children to attend school and would provide them with an education that was sufficient preparation for northern employment opportunities.

In 1973, the Man in the North Project, sponsored by the Arctic Institute of North America, released a report on education in Nunavik and the Northwest Territories that called for increased efforts to incorporate community members in the delivery of education programs, increased opportunities for training Inuit as teachers, and better preparation of non-Inuit teachers for the culture and way of life in northern communities. The goal of the Nunavik program was to demonstrate to young school-aged children that Inuit community members did “play a meaningful role within the school curriculum,” thereby facilitating their adaptation to the school culture and system. Such experimental programs reinforced the need to train Inuit teachers within their communities, thereby retaining local teachers long-term, and minimizing the discontinuity in schools associated with replacing non-Inuit teachers who usually stayed for only one or two years. According to the project’s report, training Inuit teachers would also help to ensure that culturally relevant and sensitive curricula were being delivered in northern classrooms. Concern over relevant content remains, however, as witnessed by the 2006 report by Justice Thomas Berger, conciliator of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement implementation, which recommended further increasing the relevancy of Nunavut’s educational curricula.

**Health Care**

Beginning in 1922, the Canadian government provided some health care through the Eastern Arctic Patrol, which was a ship that made annual tours of the coast and Arctic Islands. The patrol included RCMP, medical personnel, and government staff, who provided supplies, medical and dental care, and the ship was used to transport Inuit to southern hospitals for treatment. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, rates of respiratory infection, particularly tuberculosis, were much higher than the Canadian average among Inuit. In treating Inuit with tuberculosis, the Canadian government faced similar challenges as providing education in the North: the dispersed Inuit population, the shortage of medical personnel, the difficulty in transporting Inuit to hospitals, and the cost of building medical facilities. By the 1940s, there were eleven hospitals in the Northwest Territo-
ries, nine of which were operated by missions and two that were operated by mining companies. Yet, many communities lacked the health care professionals and the equipment needed to make diagnoses and to provide adequate responses for several serious and widespread ailments, including tuberculosis, influenza, cerebral-spinal meningitis, and paratyphoid fever.

Believing that the tuberculosis recovery rate was higher when Inuit were sent to pre-existing and well-staffed southern sanitaria, the government adopted a policy of sending all Inuit with tuberculosis to southern Canada, including sanitaria in Edmonton, Hamilton, and Montreal. Many Inuit, missionaries, and government personnel stationed in the North, however, were critical of this policy due to the trauma caused by the separation of Inuit family members forced to take the long trip on the arctic patrol boat to southern sanitaria, particularly when they died in the south and did not return. Nevertheless, in 1956, an estimated 10 percent of the Inuit population was receiving medical treatment, mainly for tuberculosis, in southern Canadian hospitals. Between 1953 and 1964, 4,836 Inuit in the Northwest Territories were hospitalized, and 75 to 80 percent were sent to sanitaria in southern Canada. By the early 1950s, tuberculosis was still the leading cause of death among Inuit but the rate of infection had begun to decline.

Another major cause of concern for medical personnel in the North during the mid-twentieth century was the high incidence of infant mortality. Through the shift from subsistence hunting to commercial trapping, and later wage labour, Inuit had less time and access to animals for hunting, and incorporated more carbohydrate-based foods, such as bannock, into their diets. The loss of nutrients from meat in the diet created high rates of undernourishment, which became a leading cause of death in young children. Relocations of Inuit to regions with supposedly better resources also created nutrition problems when resources did not materialize or when Inuit experienced difficulty adapting to the changed climatic conditions.

Government’s solution to alleviate undernourishment in children was to increase the availability of powdered milks and cereals, like Pablum. Government officials in communities, and members of the annual Eastern Arctic Patrol, took some pains to educate Inuit mothers in the use of these foods, including how to prepare and store them. By the mid-1960s, however, Canadian Medical Service studies continued to show high rates of mortality, now mainly among bottle-fed children. The introduction of powdered food suitable for infants discouraged mothers from breast-feeding, lowering their infants’ resistance to gastrointestinal infection, respiratory problems, middle ear problems and anemia.

Inadequate housing was also thought to contribute to infant mortality, which tended to occur at age two or three, just after children were weaned. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, most Inuit lived in sedentary communities. While government homes improved access to medical care, the shift to sedentary community life, with high levels of unemployment and nutritionally inadequate diets, led to increases in mental and other health problems, such as obesity and high rates of diabetes, depression, suicide, substance abuse, and family dysfunction.
delivery of northern health care has been hindered by inadequate infrastructure for water delivery and sewage disposal, and overcrowded housing conditions in many communities. Ensuring that elements contributing to good health, including clean water, effective waste disposal, sufficient housing, and adequate amounts of nutritious food, are present in northern communities is an issue of continual concern. The retention of medical staff in northern communities and access to culturally appropriate health care also remain significant concerns.

**Housing**

During the 1950s, concerns about northern sovereignty, health conditions, and administration of social welfare programs prompted the government to initiate construction of permanent housing for Inuit to rent or purchase. Government housing projects were particularly challenged by the high costs of building and maintaining homes in the North, including costs of transporting construction and insulation materials, fuel to heat homes, and importing builders from southern Canada.

Two of the early housing models that the federal government field tested were an igloo-shaped dwelling with a plywood floor and six-inch-thick Styrofoam walls, and the “rigid digit,” which was made from plywood sheathing with a polyethylene vapour barrier and rockwool batting insulation. Both models were designed to be portable in order to assist Inuit in maintaining some traditional subsistence practices. The rigid digit was slightly larger than a traditional family tent, and had only one room. The Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources considered the rigid digit to be transitional housing—somewhere between the size and durability of a skin tent or igloo, and southern Canadian housing standards. The total cost of each rigid digit unit was five hundred dollars, making construction of many units attractive for the federal government within communities across the Arctic. Experiments in designing Inuit-style housing were discontinued during the 1950s, however, as more Inuit became sedentary and the need for portable housing declined. In addition, none of the housing styles tested by the government were able to provide the necessary levels of cost-efficiency and durability.

Also, during the 1950s government provided more southern-style, pre-fabricated two bedroom houses for its employees, complete with plumbing and hydro, which stood in stark contrast to the size and construction quality of Inuit housing. The discrepancies in housing prompted criticism, including from government employees engaged to provide education and health services for Inuit. Inuit by the early 1970s were still objecting to the obvious discrepancies in the size and design qualities of their homes compared to the federal government’s staff housing, and were supported in their request for better housing by the members of Parliament from the Northwest Territories.

In 1959, the government established the Eskimo Housing Loan Program, which saw the construction of 1,200 “matchbox” structures. These were fixed-location dwellings, designed to meet government criteria of cost-effectiveness in construc-
tion and operation. Challenges with the program included the prohibitive cost of utilities, inadequate housing size and design for the northern climate, and Inuit inexperience with rent and mortgage payments. These houses were designed and field tested in Ottawa, and their spatial divisions reflected patterns of family use common in southern Canada, rather than spatial needs of Inuit culture and the northern way of life. For example, early homes did not include space to prepare country food, repair hunting and transportation equipment, or entertain. Further, the Inuit preference for boiling as a common method of cooking was not taken into consideration, and caused high levels of condensation leading to iced windows and warped walls and floors.

Anthropologist Peter Dawson’s 2003 study of space syntax in Inuit homes demonstrates the need to create Inuit-specific housing designs that recognize the significance of maintaining extended family cohesion through the use of large spaces for both shared and individual activities. Such ideals of spatial use encourage traditional cultural values of family solidarity, reciprocal assistance, and traditional renewable resource harvesting activities. Through his fieldwork, Dawson recorded Inuit concerns about housing design including small room size, lack of storage space, dislike of multi-storey houses, and failure of houses to stand-up to extreme climatic conditions. As housing designs in northern communities are usually still modeled on southern Canadian ideals of family spatial use, Inuit often modify their homes in a number of ways to improve efficiency of heating and water use; to improve safety; and to more closely approximate families’ traditional use of open, rather than divided, domestic space.

In the 1960s, the government redeveloped the program to address some of the earlier challenges. The new program, called the Eskimo Rental Housing Program, featured rent scaled to real income with the costs of fuel, electricity, and furniture included. Rental payments were applied to eventual home purchase. Housing constructed for the Eskimo Housing Loan Program was re-used, and larger three-bedroom models were constructed. As more Inuit moved to communities from the land, overcrowding in federally-constructed housing became a concern. Studies conducted in 1964 and 1965 showed correlations between high rates of infant mortality and respiratory disease caused by overcrowding and unsanitary housing. The government established a goal of fixed-location housing for all Inuit by 1971. Under the Eskimo Rental Housing Program, Inuit were expected to participate in a four-stage adult education program designed to assist the transition to living in fixed-location homes. The education program included instruction in safety precautions, tenants’ responsibilities, and facilitated the development of tenant associations and community governments.

In 1971, administration of northern housing was transferred to the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation under the National Housing Act. Although government housing led to declines in respiratory illness and infant mortality, and increases in day-school attendance, there were other challenges of meeting increased housing demand, as well as new health problems like diabetes and other
issues related to chronic unemployment. Inuit continued to experience inadequacies of supply and design in the housing provided for them, despite the attempts to provide sufficient amounts of affordable housing for residents of the Northwest Territories. Many issues with the size, design, quality, cost, and availability of houses in northern communities remain to this day.

Although northern housing has been increasingly administered by territorial and Inuit governments, according to Pauktuutit and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), the federal government’s 1993 withdrawal from their cost-sharing agreements for Inuit housing with the territorial governments, the Government of Quebec, and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, has had a significant and negative impact on the maintenance and availability of housing in northern communities. ITK perceives that the housing shortage in northern communities is a contributing factor to the high incidence of a variety of social problems, and seeks a federally sponsored Inuit-specific housing initiative that will ensure training and employment opportunities for Inuit, as well as home-ownership subsidies. Northern housing construction is extremely costly for all governments, and has not kept pace with the growing Inuit population, leading to high levels of overcrowding. As several people indicated during interviews for the book Canada’s Relationship with Inuit, poor-quality, overcrowded housing is directly linked to health challenges, poor school performance, and community social problems. Addressing the housing challenge is widely considered to be essential in addressing many other challenges towards closing the gap in well-being between southern Canada and the North.

Conclusion

The rise of Inuit political organizations and related evolution of comprehensive land claims represent major steps towards Inuit self-determination and control over policy matters central to Inuit concerns. Most day-to-day Inuit affairs are now administered by the territorial governments or the regional governments created through comprehensive claim settlements. Education and many health care services, for example, have increasingly shifted from federal to territorial and Inuit control through the four Inuit comprehensive claims that were settled between 1975 and 2005.

The Canadian government, however, continues to provide a number of Inuit or northern specific programs, and the Inuit Relations Secretariat was recently created within INAC to act as a hub for federal Inuit administration, which still mainly occurs through INAC at the federal level. Federal programs designed to address the cost of health care in the North, for example, include: the Northern Air Stage Program (Food Mail Program), which subsidizes the cost of transporting fresh foods to the North and is intended to lower consumers’ costs for purchasing such foods; Health Canada’s Non-Insured Health Benefits Program for Inuit (and First Nations), which covers the cost of medically necessary goods and services
not covered by the territory or province in which Inuit reside; and the Head Start Program, which prepares preschoolers for elementary school. Other important areas where the federal-Inuit relationship is being negotiated include the role of Inuit in northern sovereignty, self-government (particularly in the western Arctic and in northern Quebec), and comprehensive claim implementation.\(^81\)

All of the past policy and program mistakes that were made, whether founded on good intentions or not, represent essential lessons in ongoing policy development and implementation, and the evolving federal-Inuit relationship in general. The common themes in the early history of federal administration in the North include a lack of consultation with Inuit when developing programs and policies for their benefit, such as E-numbers, relocations, tuberculosis treatment, and residential schools or hostels; and the transposition of southern Canadian methods and materials into the North without full consideration to how they may affect Inuit, including housing design and construction materials, early educational curricula, and models of community governance. The lesson we gain from a better understanding of the historic relationship is ultimately the care and cultural competence that is required from policy analysts, senior bureaucrats, and politicians in order to develop effective programs in concert and consultation with Inuit. Far from being a thing of the past, Inuit today continue to decry governments’ lack of meaningful consultation, as witnessed by the recent Inuit Circumpolar Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty which calls on all arctic governments to engage Inuit as full partners in any and all future discussions of sovereignty.\(^82\)

Researchers and political commentators, Inuit and non-Inuit alike, have strongly spoken out against the unacceptable living conditions of many of Canada’s Inuit. And this in spite of a clear national interest in strong and healthy Inuit communities, and a current willingness on the part of the Canadian government to spend to further the cause of arctic sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. There is need to continue to report on the life circumstances of Canada’s first northern residents, not least out of a moral duty to our citizens: to look after our own, which ultimately reflects on who we are as a people and the kind of society we strive to be—one that espouses equality within diversity. John Ralston Saul recently wrote in his book, *A Fair Country*: “There seems to be little understanding in the South … that Canada as a whole benefits and is truer to itself when there are strong Northern communities that stand out as expressions of our country.”\(^83\) In order to respond to current circumstances with well-conceived policies in consultation with those whose lives they are designed to improve, we need to better understand what has come before, including the mistakes that have been made, notably a lack of consultation and cultural competence when developing those policies.
Endnotes

1 This article is based on the Government of Canada publication, *Canada's Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development*, written by Sarah Bonesteel and edited by Erik Anderson.


3 Cultural competence is a concept that has gained much currency of late in research and program delivery contexts, and is especially well developed in the field of health care delivery. See Gaye Hanson, “A Relational Approach to Cultural Competence;” National Aboriginal Health Organization, *Ways of Knowing: A Framework for Health Research*, <www.naho.ca/english/pdf/research waysof.pdf>, accessed May 4, 2009; and Marlene Brant Castellano, “Ethics of Aboriginal Research,” <http://soserv.sosci.mcmaster.ca/ihrkt/ihrkt-images/Ethics%20of%20Aboriginal%20Research.pdf>, accessed May 4, 2009. Cultural competence, for the purposes of this paper, is defined simply by Cross et al. in 1989 as: “a set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and policies that come together in a system, agency or among professionals and enable that system, agency or those professions to work effectively in cross-cultural situations.” See the National Center for Cultural Competence, <www.ncccurricul.info/culturalcompetence.html>, accessed May 7, 2009.


5 Between 1918 and 1923, the Department of the Interior’s Northwest Territories Branch treated Inuit in the Mackenzie Delta with the same status as First Nations in the region because of their close geographic proximity to one another. Inuit received economic relief, education in mission schools, and the services of a doctor at Herschel Island. Between 1921 and 1931, most government policy related to Inuit was administered by the Northwest Territories and Yukon Branch of the Department of the Interior, such as the reindeer-herding program. This program was an economic initiative designed to relieve Inuit from caribou shortage-induced starvation. Mark O. Dickerson, *Whose North? Political Change, Political Development, and Self-Government in the Northwest Territories*, pp. 31–32; and Jenness, pp. 27–28.

6 Although Indian Affairs was granted departmental status in 1880, the minister of the Interior continued to hold the position of superintendent of Indian Affairs, creating an administrative link between the departments. Dickerson, p. 33; Richard J. Diubaldo, “The Absurd Little Mouse: When Eskimos Became Indians,” p. 34; and Jenness, pp. 32–33, 53.

7 Editor’s note: *The Constitution Act* of 1867 did not explicitly deal with the North as it was not part of the Dominion at that date.

8 By 1932, the cost of Inuit relief in Quebec was nine dollars per person annually. Relief for First Nations was funded federally, as First Nations in Canada were wards of the state. The Canadian government, however, administered Inuit as citizens. Constance Backhouse, *Colour-Coded: a Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900–1950*, pp. 21–22, 34; Jenness, pp. 32, 40; and Peter Kulchyski, *Unjust Relations: Aboriginal Rights in Canadian Courts*, pp. 32–33.

9 Specifically, an 1856 HBC census of northern Quebec classified Inuit (Esquimaux) as Indians. As the Crown had invested the HBC with administrative authority, their description of Inuit was particularly significant to the Supreme Court’s decision. Although much of the region inhabited by Inuit was Rupert’s Land in 1867, and therefore not part of Canada at Confederation, the *Constitution Act, 1867* provided for the addition of territories to Confederation. Rupert’s Land was ceded to Canada in 1871. Backhouse, pp. 52–53; Diubaldo, p. 37; Kulchyski, pp. 32–33; and Brian Slattery and Sheila E. Stelck, *Canadian Native Law Cases*, pp. 123–142.

10 Members of the NWT Council and the minister of the Interior wrote to the minister of justice, who wrote to O. D. Skelton, undersecretary of state for external affairs, and requested that an
appeal be made for a reversal of the decision. The Supreme Court of Canada was created in 1875, but decisions could be appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London until 1933 for criminal appeals and 1949 for civil appeals. Jenness, p. 40; and Diubaldo, p. 39.

In 1936, the Department of the Interior was dismantled and its responsibilities for natural resource management were transferred to the Department of Mines and Resources. Within this department’s five branches, the Lands, Parks and Forest Branch administered the Bureau of Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs. This bureau was responsible for monitoring northern issues, including schools, hospitals, law and order, liquor regulations, reindeer herds, and mining. The NWT Council, under the auspices of the new bureau, continued to be the dominant administrative body to impart government services for Inuit. Most welfare, health care, and education services, however, continued to be delivered by Roman Catholic and Anglican missionary organizations. Dickerson, pp. 32, 37–46, 56; and R. Duffy, *The Road to Nunavut: The Progress of the Eastern Arctic Since the Second World War*, p 11.

*Re Eskimo* was used in a 1957 report for the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, which questioned the Newfoundland government’s legal obligation to Labrador Inuit based on Newfoundland’s 1949 entrance to Confederation, ten years after the Re Eskimo decision. Here, the Supreme Court ruling that Inuit were historically classified as Indians was used to employ a 1950 ruling by the Department of Justice. This ruling, that “it is the responsibility of the federal government to formulate and carry out all policies that are directed at dealing with Indians or Indian problems,” demonstrated federal responsibility for Labrador Inuit. C. J. Marshall, *Federal Responsibilities in Respect to the Native Population of Labrador*, p. 4.

For example, if a female infant was named after her maternal grandfather, the infant’s mother could address her child by name, or as “daughter” or “father.” This practice was considered appropriate, since many Inuit believed that namesakes often took on their name-givers personality traits. Given the small sizes of most communities, family genealogies would be well known and such multiple forms of address for each person would not cause confusion among Inuit. Kaj Birket-Smith, *The Eskimos*, pp. 138, 153–163.

Identification and Registration of Indian and Inuit People, p. 23; and Barry A. Roberts, *Eskimo Identification and Disc Numbers: A Brief History*, pp. 12–15.


These stations were designed to give at least four hours of warning to protect North America against airborne attacks from the Soviet Union.

The NORAD agreement was initially specified for a ten-year period and is now revised at five-year intervals. D. F. Holman, *NORAD in the New Millennium*, p. 12.

By the late 1950s, intercontinental missiles with thermonuclear warheads, rather than the bombers, which the DEW Line was designed to protect against, had become the major threat to North America, rendering the DEW Line technology obsolete.


These included the Mid-Canada Line and the Pine Tree Line stations, as well as stations located in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and British Columbia. The Pine Tree Line (also called the Continental Air Defense Integration North (CADIN) Line) was located along the northern boundary of the United States and stretched into Newfoundland. The Mid-Canada Line (also called the McGill Fence) was built and operated by Canada along the fifty-fifth parallel. The DEW Line sites were built along the seventieth parallel. They started in Alaska at Cape Lisburne and ran eastward along the coast, crossing to the Arctic islands, then to the Boothia and Melville peninsulas, then to the southeast corner of Baffin Island at Cape Dyer. Duffy, p. 33; N. D. Bankes, “Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic 1947–87,” p. 286; Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945–1958*, p. 2; Morrison, pp. 178–179; and Maurice Sauve, *Interim Report of the
22 Northern Rangers are paid to attend initial and annual training courses for any National Defence operations in which they participate. National Defence, May 1, 2003, Ranger FAQs, <http://www.cnna.forces.gc.ca/units/rangers/crpq_faqx_e.asp>, accessed July 14, 2005. The Northern Rangers program has increased to the present, and was expected to include 4,800 members by 2006. The Ranger Patrol makes effective use of Inuit traditional knowledge of northern lands and resources, and Inuit youth are provided with practical opportunities to acquire and make use of traditional skills and knowledge through the Junior Canadian Ranger program. Since 1942, the Canadian Ranger Patrol Group has played a significant role in maintaining Canada’s presence and sovereignty in remote regions of the North. Duffy, p. 33; and Eyre, pp. 295–296.

23 Such projects have contributed to improved community infrastructure, including airports and runways, roads, buildings, and hydro and sewage disposal systems. Eyre, p. 292.

24 For example, many of the airport runways constructed for defence projects have since been turned over to community administration, facilitating the movement of people between northern communities and southern Canada, as well as the delivery of items, like mail and fresh foods. D. K. Thomas and C. T. Thompson, Escimo Housing as Planned Culture Change, pp. 10–11.


26 These projects also served Cold War defence needs. Morrison, p. 177. For a detailed discussion of North American defence in the Canadian Arctic, see Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs.

27 The Order in Council was precipitated by a request for a land grant land in Cumberland Sound by an American navy engineer in 1874. The Order in Council did not specify that Canada had a social responsibility for Inuit welfare. Jenness, p. 17; Morris Zaslow, The Northwest Territories, 1905–1980, pp. 4–5.

28 In 1901, the government funded a North Pole expedition by Captain J. E. Bernier and his Canadian ship, Arctic. The Canadian government later appointed Bernier to make annual tours of the Arctic coast and islands on the Canadian ship, Neptune. He was given authority to inspect any ships that he encountered, and to carry out navigational and scientific studies. He also left documents declaring Canadian sovereignty on many Arctic islands. Bernier obtained much public support for his voyage, including that of Lord Strathcona, Governor General Minto, and 113 members of Parliament who signed a petition requesting that the government fund Bernier’s expedition. The government also funded Vilhalmur Stefansson’s explorations of the western Arctic Archipelago from 1913 to 1918. Jenness, pp. 22, 29–30; D. Soberman, “Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission on the Complaints of the Inuit People Relocated from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet, to Grise Fjord and Resolute Bay,” p. 55; Zaslow, The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870–1914, p. 263; and Zaslow, The Northwest Territories, 1905–1980, pp. 4–5.

29 Editor’s note: It may be of interest to readers to look at a sociological analysis of these relocations. In Chapter One of Aboriginal Conditions (White et al, UBC Press, 2003), the relocations are analyzed and it is concluded that they broke down the social capital in the communities, leading to or at least contributing to social and economic breakdown.


32 Although the government had some success with several small-scale relocations, the 1957 relocation of several Inuit families from Ennadai Lake in the Keeewatin District north to Henik Lake failed when caribou herds did not appear; after eight people died the remaining Inuit were returned to Ennadai Lake. In 1934, Inuit from Pangnirtung, Cape Dorset, and Pond Inlet were relocated to Devon Island for two years as an experiment. The government wanted to determine how difficult it would be for Inuit to adapt to the High Arctic climate. The experiment was
unsuccessful, and the Pangnirtung Inuit returned home in 1936. The Cape Dorset and Pond Inlet Inuit were relocated to Arctic Bay, then to Fort Ross in 1937. In 1947, they were relocated to Spence Bay. Although Inuit repeatedly requested to return to their homes, the government refused. According to the RCAP, “the idea that they could return home if they didn’t like the new location was key in getting the Inuit to agree to go in the first place. The failure of the government to keep its promises is a stark example of the arbitrary use of authority.” RCAP, Looking Forward, Looking Back, Vol. 1, p. 456.

Other Arctic relocations included the 1949 relocation of Inuit from Ennadai Lake to Nueltin Lake, the movement of Inuit from Garry Lake to Rankin Inlet (“Keewatin Re-establishment Project” or “Ilivia”) and Whale Cove in the 1950s, and the 1951 relocation of families from the Mackenzie Delta to Banks Island. Motivation for this move was explicitly to alleviate sovereignty concerns. Labrador Inuit were relocated from Nutak in 1956 and Hebron in 1959 to Okak Bay to centralize their administration and facilitate their transition from an economy based on hunting and fishing to industrial development. Diubaldo (1992), 31–34; Bud Neville, former Indian and Northern Affairs Canada employee, interview by author, November 9, 2004, digital recording, Public History, Ottawa; and RCAP, Looking Forward, Looking Back, Vol. 1, pp. 422–425, 460–462. For a more detailed discussion of Inuit relocations, see Frank James Tester and Peter Kulchyski, Tamarniiit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic, 1939–1963.


34 Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) initially lodged complaints about the relocation with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) in 1990. The CHRC referred the matter to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), who commissioned the Hickling Corporation to investigate the legitimacy of the claims. Hickling concluded that the government acted properly; in response, ITC appealed to the CHRC. The CHRC arranged for ITC and DIAND to review circumstances of the relocations, leading to the launch of the Royal Commission inquiry. Criticisms of the relocations include concerns that Inuit were not fully prepared to make the adaptations in lifestyle required of them, and consequently experienced food shortages and discomfort. The ITC perceived that Inuit involved in these relocations were part of an “experiment” to see if they could adapt to the climate and live independently through hunting and trapping. This perception explains why little funding or assistance was extended to them in the initial seven years of the project. As Inuit were representing Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic, the government was reluctant to grant requests for their return to Inukjuak. Grant, “Inuit Relocations to the High Arctic, 1953–1960,” pp. iii–iv; and Soberman, pp. 1–3, 55–57.

In contrast, other researchers have concluded that these relocations were conducted primarily for the economic benefit of Inuit, with sovereignty concerns remaining a side issue and a low priority in the planning and execution of the project. While some have claimed that the government did not keep its promise to return Inuit to their home communities if they wished, others have asserted that these promises were intended for only the first few years of the project and were not extended indefinitely. Therefore, in 1960, the government was not remiss in suggesting that Inuit charter their own plane to visit friends and family in northern Quebec. Hickling Corporation, “Assessment of the Factual Basis of Certain Allegations Made Before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Concerning the Relocation of Inukjuak Inuit Families in the 1950s,” pp. 1–7. See also: Shelagh D. Grant, “A Case of Compounded Error: The Inuit Resettlement Project, 1953, and the Government Response, 1990,” pp. 3–29; M. Gunther, The 1953 Relocations of the Inukjuak Inuit to the High Arctic: A Documentary Analysis and Evaluation; Marc M. Hammond, Report on Findings on an Alleged Promise of Government to Finance the Return of Inuit at Resolute and Grise Fiord to their Original Homes at Port Harrison (Inukjuak) and Pond Inlet; Alan R. Marcus, Inuit Relocation Policies in Canada and Other Circumpolar Countries, 1925–1960; Alan Rudolph Marcus, Relocating Eden: The Image and Politics of Inuit Exile in the Canadian Arctic; and RCAP, The High Arctic Relocation: Summary of Supporting Information, Vols. I and II.

35 Rosemarie Kuptana, “Ilira: Or Why it is Unthinkable for Inuit to Challenge Qallunaat Authority,” paper presented to the RCAP, April 5, 1993, Ottawa.
Despite contradiction by former civil servants’ testimony, and their caution that the actions of 1953 should not be viewed through the moral lens of 1993, the commission concluded that relocations were a product of the government’s desire to ensure Inuit self-reliance. Although food shortages were not as much of a problem in Inukjuak in the early 1950s, the government was concerned about dropping fox fur prices and the ability of Inuit to compensate for this loss of income on their own. To prevent rising welfare costs to the government, they designed the relocation project to ensure Inuit independence. According to the commission, this conclusion explains why relocated Inuit were not provided with financial and material support. RCAP, “Commission Releases Report on High Arctic Relocation,” press release, pp. 1–2.


In 1958, the Eskimo Affairs Committee made recommendations to guide all future Inuit relocations and recommended surveys of several priority regions to determine the future feasibility of relocations. These regions included Keewatin, the east coast of Hudson Bay, the Tuktoyaktuk-Coppermine region, and the north part of Baffin Island. Based on the discovery of mineral and oil deposits in the High Arctic during the 1960s, the federal government created further recommendations for Inuit relocations, suggesting Inuit be housed near weather stations in otherwise uninhabited areas, thereby maintaining Canadian sovereignty of the North and its resource extraction potential. Looking Forward, Looking Back: Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 1, pp. 422–430, 465–466, and 511–512.

Throughout the 1970s, however, the federal government continued to make decisions about the feasibility of northern communities, which affected their location and survival. Although Inuit at Killiniq in Nunavik were represented in the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, between 1975 and 1978 government services to their community, including health care and infrastructure maintenance, were gradually reduced or terminated. In February 1978, Inuit at Killiniq were notified by radio that their community would be closed, and that they would be relocated within the same day. The Killiniq Inuit, who were distributed among five Nunavik communities, have since petitioned for the establishment of a community near the original Killiniq site. Makivik Corporation, with the assistance of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, has conducted feasibility studies for this relocation. Although the studies concluded that a community near the original Killiniq site was economically viable, no action has been taken to construct the necessary community infrastructure. Looking Forward, Looking Back, pp. 422–430, 465–466, and 511–512; and Makivik Corporation, The Relocation to Taqpangajuk: a Feasibility Study, pp. i–v.


“Pragmatic” is the term used by Gordon Robertson, the Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources during the 1950s, to describe federal policy and program development for Inuit during this period. R. Gordon Robertson, interview by author, November 9, 2004, digital recording, Public History, Ottawa.

Three of the residential schools were Catholic and were located at Aklavik, Fort Resolution,
and Fort Providence. One residential school, also at Aklavik, was Anglican. Only one of the day schools, an Anglican-run facility at Pangnirtung, was located in the eastern Arctic. Of the remaining eight day schools, five were Catholic, one was Anglican, and two were public. The schools accommodated Aboriginal (Inuit, Métis, and First Nation) and non-Aboriginal students. Missionary societies were granted $400 per year to operate residential schools, $200 to $250 annually for day schools, and $500 to $1,500 was given to operate public day schools. The eastern Arctic received its first two federal day schools from the Department of Mines and Resources in 1949 and 1950. The schools were located in Coral Harbour and Cape Dorset. Government of Canada, *Education in the North*, p. 2; Duffy, pp. 95–96; Patrick Flanagan, “Schooling, Souls and Social Class: the Labrador Inuit,” pp. ii–iii, 54–56; and Ben-Dor, pp. 297–301.

47 In Canada at this time about one in fifteen Canadian Inuit were literate. Duffy, pp. 95–97, 105.

48 Hostel accommodations were established in Iqaluit, Great Whale River, Churchill, Inuvik, and Yellowknife. As well as residential schools and hostels, some Inuit children were boarded in private homes. Children living in residential schools found it physically difficult to adjust to meat-based diets and outdoor living after spending ten months in school residences. Parents expressed concern about their children’s lack of respect for the family and culture. By 1959, residential schools with vocational training and teachers’ quarters had opened in Iqaluit, Fort Macpherson, Fort Smith, and Aklavik. Between 1960 and 1967, similar facilities were constructed at Pangnirtung, Broughton Island, Arctic Bay, Resolute Bay, Clyde River, Igloolik, Pond Inlet, Grise Fiord, Padloping, Lake Harbour, and Hall Beach. Residential schools were found to be “dyseducative” for students returning to camp life or even very rural communities. The experiences of residential school were often so different from community life that students did not carry over skills or knowledge they had acquired. To the frustration of students, they were often required to repeat the same grade several times as the length of the school year was shorter for Inuit students, because of parents’ need to move to summer camps, than was needed to complete grade-level curriculum. Duffy, pp. 97, 105; Charles W. Hobart, “Report on Canadian Arctic Eskimos: some consequences of residential schooling,” pp. 13–17; David King, “A Brief Report of The Federal Government of Canada’s Residential School System for Inuit,” Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2006, <www.ahf.ca/assets/pdf/english/king-summary-f-web.pdf>, accessed June 14, 2006; and D. W. Simpson and D. K. F. Wattie, “The Role and Impact of the Educational Program in the Process of Change in Canadian Eskimo Communities,” 19th Alaskan Science Conference, p. 1.


50 Duffy, p. 106; and Simpson and Wattie, p. 2.


52 The government also realized the importance of providing at least some education during early grades in traditional languages to ease the transition of young children from home to school, and continued to expand programming that utilized languages, such as Inuktitut, the Inuit language spoken in the eastern Arctic. David Omar Born, *Eskimo Education and the Trauma of Social Change*, p. 1.

53 These assistants are the first example of Inuit as classroom teachers. Teachers were expected to participate in community activities after school hours and were often leaders of recreational and organized activities, such as Girl Guide and Boy Scout groups. Many northern teachers had one year of experience and were between the ages of twenty-six and thirty. By 1960, all northern teachers had at least a first-class teaching certificate. Government of Canada, *Education in the North: Ten Years of*, pp. 5–6, 13; D. K. F. Wattie, “Education in the Canadian Arctic,” p. 298.

Federally run adult education and vocational programs were also offered to prepare Inuit for work in viable economic opportunities, while ensuring maintenance of their connection with family and community. The 1968 manual for a course in managing co-operative businesses for Inuit, sponsored by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, is an example of such an initiative. The course was designed and packaged for instruction within northern communities, and includes speaking notes, visual aids, and a coursebook for participants that is translated into both English and Inuktitut. The course explained the history of the shift from a subsistence-oriented way of
life to a wage-labour oriented lifestyle, how Arctic co-operatives should operate, and where co-operatives existed within the context of the Canadian and international economies. Born, p. 1; and Keith J. Crowe and E. Erkloo, *Introduction to Arctic Co-operatives*, pp. 1–2.


The Department of Resources and Development sent a representative on the RCMP annual Eastern Arctic Patrol to assess the level of education then provided to Inuit and to make recommendations for their future needs. The government realized it was impractical for Inuit to maintain traditional subsistence practices, and that some degree of assimilation to southern Canadian culture would be required for their successful participation in the wage economy. Duffy, p. 102.


Jose Kusugak, “The Inuit of Canada: Charting the Future in the New Millennium,” p. 6; “Timelines and Milestones: 30 Years With ITC,” p. 43; and Duffy, pp.118–119.

The Inuit Cultural Institute is a branch organization of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, whose objective is to preserve and promote traditional Inuit languages and cultures. Duffy, pp. 118–121.

NICE lacked funding, however, only met once, and did not establish any alternative educational programming for Inuit. Duffy, p.121.

This report was based on experimental studies carried out under the project in 1971 and 1972, which included community-guided education in Nunavik, an apprentice teacher program for Inuit, and educating southern teachers to prepare them for their role in the North. Man in the North Project, *Education in the Canadian North: Three Reports, 1971–1972*, pp. v, 7–9.

Ibid., pp. 57, 115–125. The apprentice teacher program provided training opportunities for Inuit that combined academic upgrading with in-service training. The program to acculturate Canadians for northern teaching focused on the culture and history of the North and its communities, respecting the significance Inuit placed in maintaining and transferring knowledge of traditional skills to young people, and providing assistance to teachers in their process of acculturating to the North.


Diseases such as influenza, measles, small pox, chicken pox, and poliomyelitis were particularly detrimental to Inuit populations. Medical supplies were left with community “distributors,” such as the RCMP and Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) personnel, as well as the Roman Catholic and Anglican missionary hospitals. The Eastern Arctic Patrol began in 1922 on the Canadian ship *Arctic*, captained by J. E. Bernier. In 1925, *Arctic* was retired and replaced by *Beothic*, then *Ungava* in 1932, *Nascopie* in 1933 (this was an HBC ship), C. D. Howe in 1950, and *d’Iberville* in 1953. Duffy, p. 52; and C. R. Maundrell and C. Graham-Cumming, “Health of the Original Canadians, 1867–1967,” pp. 142–146.

Nine of these facilities were located in the western Arctic, and only two were in the eastern Arctic, with one also serving Inuit in northern Quebec. Eldorado Mining and Refining Ltd. at Great Bear Lake, and Consolidated Mining and Smelting Co. at Yellowknife owned the mining company facilities. These facilities were quite small and mainly treated their employees but would also take outside patients. The two hospitals in the eastern Arctic were the Catholic facility at Chesterfield Inlet and the Anglican St. Luke’s Hospital and Industrial Home at Pangnirtung, which also served northern Quebec. Duffy, p. 52.

Inuit may still have difficulty finding the burial place of family members who died from tuberculosis in southern sanatoria, as sometimes the only grave marker used was an Inuk’s E-number, with the original name references hidden within government archives.

In a 1960 article published in the *Northern Affairs Bulletin*, Abraham Okpik (who later led Project Surname on behalf of the federal government) wrote about the two years of tuberculosis care that he received at the Misericordia Hospital in Edmonton and then at the Charles Cammell Hospital. According to Okpik, the federal government’s intervention during the 1940s tuberculo-
sis epidemic was the beginning of the transition period for Inuit from a traditional way of life to one influenced by southern Canadian culture. As Okpik states, “none of us Eskimo people ever had time to ask how the Government of Canada got interested in our general health.” Abraham Okpik, “What do the Eskimo People Want,” pp. 38–39.

For example, in 1946, 37 children under age fifteen died on southern Baffin Island, and approximately 20 children died in the Cumberland Sound area. Most of these children were undernourished and lived in what administrators considered “poorer” camps. Most children died between December and March when food was in shortest supply. Between 1956 and 1958, infant mortality rates across Canada averaged 31 per 100,000. Among Inuit, however, the infant mortality rate was 230 per 100,000. Mortality rates among infants between two and twelve months old were higher than for newborns under one month of age, leading the Northern Health Services Office to conclude that inadequate housing with poor heating, unsanitary living conditions, exposure to viruses and bacteria, lack of parental hygiene education, and inaccessible medical care were the main causes of infant mortality. Duffy, pp. 74–86. See also Richard J. De Boer, “Observations of the Maternal-Infant Caretaking Modalities Among the Netsilik Eskimo of the Central Canadian Arctic.”

A study by the Department of Pensions and National Health in 1944 determined that Inuit in remote areas with little access to the HBC, and reliant on country diets, were generally healthier than Inuit living near HBC posts. Although the government made substantial efforts toward improving access to medical care and housing for Inuit during the 1950s and 1960s, educational programs in nutrition did not develop at the same rate, leading to deficiencies, such as iron, calcium, and vitamins C and D, and widespread illness.

The prevalence of these issues has contributed to northern Canada being labelled a “fourth world.” According to O’Neil, fourth worlds are “structured as internal colonies in relation to the larger nation-state, … [where] the populations involved are the original inhabitants of the area, whose lands have been expropriated and who have become subordinate politically and economically to an immigrant population. Fourth World peoples generally inhabit marginal geographic regions relative to central metropolitan areas, and their resources have historically been exploited by the dominant group without local consultation … Fourth World situations continue to be structured by colonial policies. Most importantly, Fourth World peoples are often aggressively involved in ethno-nationalist movements.” John D. O’Neil, “Health Care Delivery in an Inuit Settlement: A Study of Conflict and Congruence in Inuit Adaptation to the Cosmopolitan Medical System,” p. 280.

In 1959, 125 “rigid digits” were constructed in northern communities. Rigid digit homes were purchased by Inuit on a payment installment plan. In northern Quebec, structures made of sod, stone, and wood with moss chinking were tested. Bud Neville, former Indian and Northern Affairs Canada employee, interview by author, November 9, 2004, digital recording, Public History, Ottawa; Leo Bereza, “Rigid Frame Houses,” p. 38; and Nixon, pp. 122–125, 140.

This style of home provided no separate areas for quiet study or cleaning caribou skins, thereby impeding the educational progress of Inuit children and their parents’ efforts at maintaining household hygiene. Nixon, pp. 130–132, 141.


Michael Corley Richardson, “Community Development in the Canadian Eastern Arctic: Aspects of Housing and Education,” pp. 104–105; and Robert Robson, “Housing in the Northwest Territories,” pp. 4–5. According to Nixon, Inuit were not consulted about the design or manufacture of the government-built houses in their communities. Heating and sanitation were often inadequate, rendering these houses little better than traditional Inuit homes in their ability to lower mortality rates and the spread of respiratory disease. Nixon, pp. 141, 157–158. In Labrador, housing programs for Inuit were developed by the provincial government to assist the recovery of tuberculosis patients, and in regions with economic potential, such as southern Labrador. This region had trees to construct homes and burn for heat, as well as the Goose Bay airport to provide


75 According to Robson, the initiative’s focus on the eastern Arctic, where 83 % of new housing stock was constructed, and in particular the communities of Frobisher Bay (Iqaluit) and Baker Lake, which received 23 % of the new housing stock, reflected the federal government’s plan to centralize the Inuit population at two administrative centres. In total, 864 housing units were constructed under the Eskimo Rental Housing Program, with 784 units being constructed in the Northwest Territories and 80 units constructed in northern Quebec. Of the 784 units constructed in the Northwest Territories, 655 were constructed in the eastern Arctic, with Frobisher Bay receiving 101 units and Baker Lake receiving 79 units. The remaining 475 units were constructed in communities throughout the Frobisher Bay and Keeewatin regions. Robson notes that few new housing units were constructed in the western Arctic, mainly because of the relocation projects at Aklavik, Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk, which precluded the need for additional housing projects in those communities. Robson, p. 7.

76 Jean Bruce, “Arctic Housing,” p. 3.

77 All tenants were required to pay some rent, and most rents ranged between thirty-seven and sixty-seven dollars per month, based on the size of the house and each family’s ability to pay. Richardson, p. 95.

78 Such programs included the 1967 Territorial Ordinance (which was renamed the Territorial Purchase Program) and the 1968 Northern Rental Purchase Program. Under this latter program, which replaced the earlier ethnically-based housing programs, the federal and territorial governments intended to construct 1,558 housing units within forty-three northern communities. In reality, 1,378 housing units were constructed. Unlike earlier housing initiatives that had focused on the eastern Arctic, this program included housing units for the Dene in the Northwest Territories and focused on the western Arctic, and in particular the region surrounding Yellowknife. Through the rental purchase program, rents were applied to home down payments. By 1987 this program had largely ended, as any houses left from the initial construction were in such poor condition that they were no longer saleable. Robson, p. 7.


81 At least three of the regional Inuit beneficiary corporations recently joined a coalition of First Nations groups pressuring the federal government into more actively implementing the terms of their agreements.
